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Introduction  
The development of European Union (EU) legislation is still a rather obscure process in 
the perception of a wider public. The system of committees within the EU polity 
represents a major feature contributing to this opaqueness (Rhinard 2002). There are a 
multitude of committees, differing in membership, legal base, decision-rule, and function; 
participating in different policy domains and stages of the policy-making process 
(Christiansen & Kirchner 2000: 4-8). The fact that not even a reliable estimate of the 
overall number of EU committees can be given (Buitendijk & van Schendelen 1995: 40; 
Larsson 2003: 127-129) is a good illustration of the little knowledge we have about the 
working of the system.  
My project aims at contributing to filling this gap in the literature. Focusing on 
working parties in the Council of Ministers, it will be investigated what type of influence 
these committees exert in the preparation of policy positions and proposals for the 
Council. There are two main contesting views on this topic. Rational choice theorists 
claim that the outcomes of negotiations among national officials reflect the results of 
intergovernmental bargaining (e.g. Garrett 1992; Moravcsik 1998), whereas social 
constructivists see these outcomes as brought about by supranational deliberations (e.g. 
Joerges & Neyer 1997a, 1997b). The main goal of the research project is to evaluate the 
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relative explanatory power of these two competing theoretical accounts of EU decision-
making. In the next section, the two approaches are discussed in some more detail and 
their key differences are identified. The second section deals with the research design, the 
selection of cases, data collection and possible methods of analysis. 
 
Theoretical approaches 
Whether the negotiation outcomes in committees solely reflect the interests and 
bargaining power of member states or are generally biased towards more integrationist 
policies should depend on characteristics of the actors and the nature of the bargaining 
process itself, that is the style or mode of negotiation. According to intergovernmentalist 
reasoning, committee members are strictly rational actors who pursue the interests of the 
member state they represent (e.g. Moravcsik 1998)2, whereas constructivist arguments 
stress the influence of European institutions on norms, values, and even interests held by 
national representatives.  
In this view, delegates of member states are exposed to socialization processes; 
their properties and preferences change as a result of social interaction within EU 
institutions (Checkel 2001: 220-221). Based on a shared set of European norms, 
negotiation among actors will be dominated by argumentative persuasion to reach a 
collectively best solution to a common problem (Joerges & Neyer 1997a: 618). In 
contrast, in rational intergovernmentalist accounts preferences are fixed and given 
exogenously and hard-headed bargaining occurs for the realization of national interests. 
Table 1 lists several key differences between supranational deliberation (SD) and 
intergovernmental bargaining (IB). Some of these assumptions imply specific 
relationships of factors with the final decision-outcome or with the policy position held 
during the negotiation process. Thus, hypotheses can be derived which allow for a 
empirical test of the two theories3.  
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Table 1: Key differences in assumptions of the two theoretical approaches 
 
 
 
Supranational Deliberation Intergovernmental 
Bargaining 
Information Imperfect 
 
Perfect 
 
Preferences Diffuse 
Endogenous 
Clear 
Exogenous 
Sources of power Immaterial 
(expertise, authenticity) 
High salience 
Material 
(economic size, voting power) 
Low salience 
Goals Collective utility 
maximization 
Individual utility 
maximization 
Relevance of 
institutions 
Informal institutions Formal institutions 
 
Research design and methodology 
Empirical researchers in political science often face the trade off between having high 
quality data and having a large number of cases. Valid and reliable data assures that we 
have more confidence in the findings of an analysis; a large number of cases shows us 
that these results are not confined to some particular instances. Due to limited resources 
in practice, one goal can often only be achieved at the expense of the other. Regarding the 
goal of generalizability of results, a promising data collection method for deriving 
information on a large number of cases are expert interviews (see e.g. van den Bos 1991; 
Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman 1994; Selck & Keading 2004; and the contributions in 
European Union Politics 5, 1 in 2004).  
But while the kind of information collected through this method, some rather 
inter-subjectively accessible basic features of the decision-making process, might be 
sufficient for examining and comparing rational choice models of EU decision-making, 
sociological accounts require data on the background of all individuals and on relations 
among committee members. A single informant does not possess such information. Thus, 
it is more appropriate to focus on a limited number of legislative proposals and to aim at 
interviewing all working party members. This might lead to the inclusion of actors who 
did not play any role in the negotiations, but there are no justifications to decide a priori 
which member states are more or less important in reaching a certain decision (Bailer & 
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Schneider 2004: 64). Besides, it lies in the nature of sociological arguments that they refer 
to systemic features, and in order to measure these, one cannot rely on only part of the 
people that make up the system. In short, since there is no way, given the resources 
available, to gain the information necessary to evaluate hypotheses on SD in a large-N 
design, the project will focus pragmatically on a small number of legislative proposals.  
However, in small-N designs there are other means to assess the generalizability 
of theoretical claims. One of them is to consider cases that differ widely in their a priori 
likelihood of corroborating a certain theory (cf. King et al. 1994: 209-210). But how do 
we derive estimates of such probabilities in an inter-subjectively reproducible way? A 
possibility is to let the theories, or rather their proponents, speak for themselves and 
utilize the scope conditions mentioned in their accounts. IB is relatively sparse in this 
respect; implicitly suggesting to be applicable to EU-negotiations between member states 
irrespective of policy domain, level of politicization, policy type, etc. Proponents of SD, 
on the other hand, often speculate on possible limits of the applicability of their theory. 
Most prominently, fundamental uncertainty about the distributive effects of policies and 
the mutual socialization of actors into an epistemic community5 are presented as likely 
conditions for honest deliberation to occur (Joerges & Neyer 1997a: 618; Risse 2000: 19; 
Krapohl 2003: 194-193)6.  
While the extent of socialization into epistemic communities is an attribute of 
delegates, and thus cannot serve as a primary criterion for the selection of proposals, the 
extent of uncertainty about distributional outcomes, and thus interests, can be related to 
specific policy fields in a plausible way. Furthermore, the extent of uncertainty also 
relates to some of the key assumptions of IB, namely perfect information and fixed and 
static preferences of actors7. Thus, policy domains characterized by high uncertainty 
about distributive effects should be least likely to confirm IB claims but most likely to 
confirm SD hypotheses. Just the opposite result is expected in areas where transparency 
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of distributional consequences is high. Here, IB hypotheses are most likely to be 
confirmed, while SD assertions are most likely to be rejected.  
Areas dealing with risk-regulation, like environment or health and consumer 
protection, where a large amount of technical and scientific expertise is required, are 
plausible candidates for policy areas with high distributional uncertainty8. Obviously 
redistributive policy areas are agriculture or cohesion, where the outcomes are often 
explicitly discernable in monetary terms. To sum up, one working party will be selected 
from a policy area at each end of the ‘uncertainty’-dimension. 
 
Table 2: Selection of working parties according to level of uncertainty in policy area 
 
Degree of Uncertainty High Low 
Type of policy Risk-regulation Redistribution 
Examples Environment, 
Health & Consumer Protection 
Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Cohesion 
Supranational 
deliberation 
Most likely supported Least likely supported 
Intergovernmental 
bargaining 
Least likely supported Most likely supported 
  
Ideally, a representative of each member state and of the Commission will be consulted 
in each of these working parties, resulting in about 32 interviews (pre-enlargement). 
Furthermore, each of the interviewees will be questioned on negotiations on three 
legislative proposals, leading to about 96 observations9. Hence, the resulting six 
proposals constitute the cases under study, whereas the actual unit of observation for 
testing theoretical claims is the individual actor dealing with one of these proposals10.  
Interview questionnaires will be designed in a standardized manner, consisting 
mainly of closed questions. They are the main source of information regarding 
sociological variables. Besides categorical indicators, which can measure for example the 
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length of participation in a working group or the number of days devoted to work on 
European affairs (cf. Egeberg et al. 2003), network analytic measures seem especially 
useful to capture relational characteristics (Scott 2000: 3; cf. Wasserman & Faust 1994)11 
of working groups, like the authenticity and knowledge of actors as perceived by their 
colleagues. Information on the positions of member states throughout the negotiations 
will also be collected by the interviews, but double-checked against the minutes and 
outcomes of proceedings of the working parties. These documents are also used to 
identify contentious issues in the proposal and the final outcome of negotiations. 
Indicators for different power resources can be inferred from secondary sources. The 
Gross National Product is usually used as a proxy for economic power and the Banzhaf 
or Shapley-Shubik index as a measure for voting power (e.g. Bailer 2004: 102, 107-109).  
The relative explanatory power of the different hypotheses will be investigated 
through statistical analyses. Logistic regression (cf. Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000) is a 
suitable method for analyzing the likelihood of a change in the negotiation position, while 
ordinary-least-square regression (cf. Hamilton 1992) could be used to examine the 
variation in the extent of change in the position and the overall negotiation success. 
Statistical methods have the advantage that they give a quantitative estimate of the 
relative explanatory power of different variables over and above the effects of ‘rival’ 
explanatory variables. Hence, in this respect, they are relatively well suited for 
competitive hypotheses testing. In addition, scope conditions and institutional effects, in 
other words interacting variables, can be investigated through the introduction of 
multiplicative terms in the regression equation (cf. Jaccard et al. 1990; Aiken & West 
1991; for an application to EU decision-making see Bailer 2004). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Expected relationships among Variables 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Proximity to Negotiation 
outcome 
Change in Negotiation 
position 
Independent 
Variable SD IB SD IB 
Expertise + 0 - 0 
Authenticity + 0 - 0 
Voting Power 0 + 0 - 
Economic size 0 + 0 - 
Salience + - - + 
Socialization - 0 + 0 
Min-Win-Coal. 0 + 0 - 
 
Table A2: Data Collection Plan 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 (1) Health & 
Consumer Protection  
 
QMV  
Codecision 
  (2) Agriculture  
 
 
QMV  
Consultation  
 (1) + (2) 
Total 
       
 16 Interviews   16 Interviews  32 Interviews 
       
 Proposal 1  
Nobs1,1 = 16 
  Proposal 1  
Nobs2,1 = 16 
 
      
 Proposal 2  
Nobs1,2 = 16 
  Proposal 2  
Nobs2,2 = 16 
 
      
 Proposal 3  
Nobs1,3 = 16 
  Proposal 3  
Nobs2,3 = 16 
 
      
Number of 
cases =  
6 Proposals 
 Nobs1,* = 48   Nobs3,* = 48  
      
Nobstotal = 96 
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